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PREFACE
This report analyses the developments end effects of healthcare integration
in the European Union. Even though the mobility of patients is fairly low
at present this can be expected to change if for example information on
available treatments becomes readily available to the citizens and if rules
and rights become more transparent. The report also addresses to what
extent different national healthcare models are affected more or less
by increased patient mobility and what other factors, such as quality
and quantity of health care supply, may affect mobility. The report finally
looks at the different views of the member states on health services in a
European context. 
SIEPS conducts and promotes research and analysis on European policy
issues within the disciplines of political science, law and economics.
SIEPS strives to act as a link between the academic world and policy-
makers at various levels. This is the fifth report from the research pro-
gramme The EU’s Internal Market: Effects on Central Areas which aims
at analysing the impact of the internal market on a number of domestic
policy areas and regulatory regimes.
Stockholm, June 2007
Jörgen Hettne
Acting Director
SIEPS
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6EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Until recently, healthcare was one of the core policy areas of the welfare
state which was held relatively secluded from the impact of European
integration. However, since 1998 this state of insulation has been abruptly
interrupted by the judicial activism of the European Court of Justice.
Through the judicial interpretation of the meaning of the Treaty, internal
market principles were applied to the policy field of healthcare. Since
then, accumulated legal reasoning has extended the regulatory scope of
European patient mobility and intra-European patient rights have gradually
materialised, albeit in a rather fragmented and non-transparent way. So far
politics has remained passive, observing the developments behind the
traditional boundaries of the welfare state – unable to act collectively.
However, during autumn 2006 stakeholder contributions have been called
for by the Commission and Council negotiations wait ahead.
The present report analyses the developments, impacts and challenges of
internal market principles on national healthcare institutions across the EU.
The report examines how the development of patient mobility has affected
the healthcare systems of EU25. The report concludes that the adaptive
pressures on national healthcare models have not forced member states to
respond in converging ways. However, this does not mean that EU patient
mobility does not bring considerable impact and future challenges. It does.
So far, impact and challenges are seen foremost through redefined national
means of control and organising principles of public healthcare, as well as
by the fact that European patients have been provided a new exit option
to opt out of national institutions – an exit option that Union citizens are
likely to increasingly make use of as they become better informed and
familiar with cross border healthcare supplies. EU patient mobility pro-
vides a strong example of a new dimension of European integration, and
pinpoints what happens and what is redefined when Union citizens start to
practice their European rights.  
71 INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the traditional core of the welfare state has been relatively
secluded from European integration. Healthcare has been one such core
welfare area which for long was held largely insulated from the regulatory
acts of the European Union (EU). However, quite recent integration
dynamics seem to have definitively ended the nationally insulated status of
healthcare and the European polity increasingly impacts on this policy
field. 
This report analyses the developments, impacts and challenges of internal
market principles on national healthcare institutions across the EU. The
report analyses how the development of patient mobility has affected the
healthcare systems of EU-25. Due to lack of data, the analysis does not
include the 2007 enlargement, i.e. it does not include research on Rumania
and Bulgaria. 
The report is structured through three analytical questions; what are the
supranational developments regarding patient mobility? To what extent
have the developments had an impact on the healthcare systems of the EU
member states? And which challenges do national healthcare systems face?
The questions of impacts and challenges are dealt with on the basis of an
examination of the national healthcare supplies of EU25, in order to
research how individual systems may be challenged in different ways. 
The remaining parts of this introduction discusses the theoretical setting for
understanding healthcare integration, through the lenses of healthcare con-
vergence versus institutional diversity, Europeanisation as well as through
a theoretical frame viewing integration as processes of spatial (re)con-
figuration and new exit options. The report then turns to the empirical
analysis. The analysis begins in section 2 by laying down developments. It
first describes the politically initiated, but judicially dynamised process
through which the contours of a Europe for the patients have been drawn. It
includes recent developments where the rights of European patients are
increasingly brought into focus and where the Commission has recently
closed an open consultation process on health services. 
Section 3 examines the national settings, describing the European health-
care families and their mutual reliance on the principle of territoriality,
which essentially means that healthcare has been territorially bound within
each member state. Against this background, section 4 analyses the extent
to which the different European healthcare models face change, i.e. the
questions of impacts and future challenges. It does so by questioning
which factors in the different national healthcare systems should stimulate
8or constitute barriers to EU patient mobility. This is done by addressing
what motivates a patient’s choice on the individual level, what at the public
policy level may motivate patients to seek treatment in another member
state and finally by analysing the different political standpoints of the
member governments towards patient mobility and towards supranational
healthcare competences. This analysis includes different perceptions of
non-hospital versus hospital care, of ‘undue delay’ as well as the specific
positions of the newer member states which tend to regard challenges from
a very different perspective than older member states. 
The report concludes in section 5 that the adaptive pressure on national
healthcare models has not forced member states to respond in converging
ways. Instead, impacts depend on a set of mediating factors that transmit
EU developments to the national outcome. That, however, does not mean
that patient mobility does not bring considerable impact and future chal-
lenges. It does. By redefining traditional means of control and organising
principles and by the fact that European patients have been provided with
an ‘exit’ opportunity to opt out of national institutions, as an addition to
their traditional ‘voice’ as voters. European citizens are increasingly likely
to use this exit opportunity as they become better informed about the intra-
European healthcare supplies and as rights and rules become more trans-
parent.
1.1 Towards Healthcare Convergence?
Examining the impact of European integration on national healthcare poli-
cies addresses the question of Europeanization. The study of European-
ization aims to understand and explain both the processes of change that
national policies, politics and polities undergo as a result of EU integration
together with the specific challenges and, eventually, impacts of EU inte-
gration.1
When analysing ‘impact’, one important question for the present study is
whether the Europeanization of healthcare will lead to the convergence of
national healthcare policies. A key assumption in the hypothesis of conver-
gence is that embracing common imperatives and common challenges will
lead to similar outcomes and national policies and polities will converge in
the longer perspective – despite their significant differences. Essentially
this means that when member states are exposed to the same challenge and
1 For the discussion of the different definitions of Europeanization, see among others Radaelli
2003, Vink & Graziano 2007, Lenschow 2006.
9adaptive pressure, they will also embark on the same road towards the
same final destination (Dubois & McKee 2004, p. 45). Over time, the out-
come of being regulated by a common imperative will be convergence.  
The theoretical insights provided by the study of Europeanization are,
however, that converging outcomes are relatively unlikely. The opposing
hypothesis to convergence is the one of institutional diversity, where
national policies and polities are either barriers to – or mediate – EU-
induced change. Supranational imperatives will be dealt with through
distinct national choices and rationales. 
Studies of Europeanization point out that mediating factors, transmitting the
Europeanization process, are decisive for the final impact of European inte-
gration on national policies. Mediating factors are explanatory variables
which explain how the same independent variable, European integration,
may have very different outcomes. These variables bring domestic factors
back into focus. They cover a wide range of both national actors and
institutions, including administrative capacity, national legacies, veto points
and cultures of compliance (Schmidt 2002; Haverland 2000; Börzel 1999,
2005; Falkner et. al 2005). Some may facilitate the process of European-
ization while others limit it. 
There are above all three mediating factors in the present context which
stand out as being decisive to the Europeanization of healthcare. The first
is de facto patient mobility. The extent to which European citizens receive
treatment in another member state constitute the de facto adaptive pressure
on national healthcare institutions. If patients are not willing to move, the
right of free movement has no impact in reality. The second factor is a veto
point, i.e., the way in which the national administration (re)interprets EU-
relevant decisions for health. This veto point limits Europeanization from
the start, as it provides the national administration with interpretive discre-
tion which may hinder the full impact of EU integration. However, the
analysis will point out that such a veto point is dynamic and the national
discretionary scope may narrow as EU integration continues. The third
mediating factor concerns the national institutions in place, i.e., the health-
care model/family. Different aspects of the established institutional legacy
may make one model or financial method more exposed to European inte-
gration than another. 
In general research, Europeanization is likely to be rendered more com-
plicated by the fact that both independent and mediating variables are
simultaneously in flux, i.e. it involves examining the effect of a dynamic
cause transmitted by dynamic national institutions. In this way, Europeaniza-
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Figure 1: The Europeanization of Healthcare Policy
tion takes place as a result of multiple influences rather than simply as a top-
down EU-imposed or induced process of change. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the scope of EU-induced change is expected to be
filtered through a set of mediating variables, which differ for the member
states. The time span that the figure addresses is the development and
impact up to now (spring 2007). Within this time span, the expected out-
come is institutional divergence, based on the argument that the institution-
alisation of the EU rules on patient mobility have not yet developed to the
extent that they can erode the divergences contained in the mediating
factors. However, in the longer run EU regulation is likely to become more
detailed and institutionalised; de facto patient mobility may increase con-
siderably; the discretionary scope of national administrations will diminish
and national institutions will reform gradually due to the EU imperative.
Such a future scenario would lead to a gradual convergence – or at least
greater similarities between national systems.
1.1.1 European Integration as New Exit Options
European integration can be regarded as a process of new centre forma-
tion, which at the same time provides exit options for the citizens of its
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member states.2 This perspective seems fruitful when analysing the devel-
opments and impacts of healthcare integration. As will be demonstrated
below, internal market principles have gradually come to provide exit
options for the European citizen from the national territory. 
European integration contains its own process of spatial (re)configuration
(Ferrera 2005, p. 7). Hirschman’s famous concepts of exit, voice and loyalty
operated with exit and voice as alternative individual reactions to the per-
formance of the political centre, where the citizen either left (exited) the
polity s/he was dissatisfied with or participated (voiced) in its political
interactions (Hirschman 1970). The gradual steps of European welfare
integration open up the nation-state boundaries. The welfare state is in this
report argued to be structured upon two main organising principles; the
principle of social citizenship and the principles of territoriality (Marshall
1950; Cornellissen 1996). The first prescribes that the scope of social shar-
ing covers those who belong to the national community, through citizen-
ship or, possibly, through the status as long term residents. The other prin-
ciple rules that social benefits can only be consumed within the national
territory and thus that the social responsibility of the state goes no further
than its territorial boundaries. Both principles are essentially foreclosing
exit options through state boundaries. As the principle of territoriality is
foremost relevant for the interrelation between EU integration and national
healthcare, it is primarily this principle that will be addressed in the sub-
sequent analysis whereas the principle of social citizenship constitutes a
fundamental part of the underlying logic. One of the main functions of the
principle is to maintain the administrative and political control of national
authorities over welfare consumption. The demarcation of public policies
thus also relates to the organisation of internal hierarchies (Bartolini 2005)
and constructs national means of control, preserved by closure. 
The steps of integration encroach on the boundary demarcations behind
which the EU member states have structured their public goods and ser-
vices and it provides new exit options. EU patient mobility is an empirical
manifestation of how new exit options develop and at the same time cause
national reconfigurations of boundaries and their organising principles. In
addition, patient mobility mirrors perhaps a more contemporary form of
exit. It is not mobility in a classic sense, meaning settlement on another
territory as an individual reaction against the performance of the welfare
polity to which one belongs. Instead, it concerns temporary exits from the
2 For very insightful theoretical and empirical elaborations of the restructuring processes of
the European polity based on the classical theories of Hirshman and Rokkan, see among
others Bartolini (2005) and Ferrera (2005).
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national territory. It goes hand in hand with – and is fortified by – new
opportunities of choice and a strengthened focus on patient rights. Funda-
mentally, it questions traditional understandings of collective loyalty
towards public supplies and brings in a more market-oriented logic. Patient
mobility addresses a different form of exit option, namely exiting from
public supplies and choosing to consume welfare elsewhere. 
Analysing the impact and challenges of patient mobility cannot be separated
from an examination of patient choice. The analysis must necessarily
include an examination of the institutional and individual barriers and
incentives to exit. In order to examine impact and challenges, a part of the
analysis below questions what motivates patients’ choice and examines this
at the micro level, i.e. from the actor perspective, at the policy level and at
the political level, i.e. surveying how member states react to the current
developments and challenges. 
Below, the analysis initiates by looking at the developments integrating
healthcare in the European Union. In the following section, we turn to the
institutionalisation process of EU regulation on patient mobility. How far
have developments taken us up to the spring of 2007? 
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2 DEVELOPMENTS – INTEGRATING PUBLIC
HEALTHCARE THROUGH INTERNAL MARKET
PRINCIPLES
Until 1998, access to foreign public healthcare providers in the EU was
regulated solely through the system coordinating social security rights, i.e.
Regulation 1408/71, which originally aimed to secure the free movement
of certain types of ‘qualified’ workers, and was subsequently broadened to
promote the free movement of workers in general and gradually came to
include more and more categories of persons in its regulatory scope. This
piecemeal inclusion of different categories of persons has recently been
codified by the Council. Regulation 883/2004 covers all persons who are
nationals of a member state, irrespective of economic activity.3 The
member states, the Commission and the ECJ appeared to have found
an inter-institutional consensus that European citizens were entitled to
immediate and necessary healthcare in other member states as well as
other kinds of publicly financed health treatment, provided that they had
been authorised beforehand by the competent national institution. This is
how Regulation 1408/71 governs the field today. Should one fall ill during
a temporary stay in another member state or should one require treatment
while temporarily in another member state due to a chronic illness, one is
entitled to this treatment on the basis of the European health insurance
card. Launched in March 2004 under the headline “More Europe in Your
Pocket”4 the health card replaced the former Community form E111,
which used to verify the holders right to immediate healthcare. Further-
more, the Regulation entitles a person to planned treatment in another
member state, but only provided that the treatment has been authorised
beforehand by the competent national institution and verified in a
Community form E112. Due to significant judicial activism back in the
late 1970s,5 where the European Court laid down that member states were
obliged to grant authorisation both where treatment in another member
state was more effective and where the treatment in question was not pro-
vided by the competent member state, the member states had collectively
emphasised that the healthcare service must be part of the competent
3 Although the new Regulation 883/2004 was adopted on 29th April 2004, it does not enter
into force before the implementation regulation is adopted by the Council. The proposal on
the implementing regulation was adopted by the Commission on 31 January 2006, COM
(2006) 16, and is currently being negotiated in the Council working group on social affairs. 
4 See press release http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/news/2004/mar/healthcard_en.html
5 See the Pierik cases; Case 117/77, 16 March 1978. Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds
Drenthe-Platteland v. G. Pierik. ECR 1978, page 825 & Case 182/78, 31 May 1979. Bestuur
van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland v. G. Pierik. ECR 1979, page 1977.
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member state’s health care package.6 At that point, the member states thus
managed to overcome ‘the joint decision trap’ (Scharpf 1988; 2006) and in
consensus overruled the interpretations of the Court. From then on, a kind
of reconciliation appeared to have been established between the ECJ, the
Commission and the member states. Due to the tool of prior authorisation,
healthcare supply was very much controlled by the member states and
the discretion in deciding whether to grant authorisation or not was left
unchallenged. In absolute terms, few authorisations seem to have been
granted apart from the case of Luxembourg which seem to rely to some
extent to foreign health care provision. However, the few observations
where we have data on the ratio between requests and actual authorisa-
tions, the national authorities seem not to have been particularly restrictive
although the data is too patchy for any definitive conclusions.
Table 1: Number of People Requesting and Obtaining Prior
Authorisation for Treatment Abroad in Selected Member
States7
No of authorisation No of authorisations
Year requests granted
Austria Per year 1996-2002 Not available 850
Belgium Per year 1996-2000 Not available 2000
Denmark Per year 1996-2000 40-50 25-35
2000* Not available 70
2001* Not available 75
Finland 2001 Not available 9
2002 Not available 4
France Per year 1996-1999 310 197
Ireland Per year 2000-2001 600 Not available
Italy 1999 Not available 16280
Luxembourg 1998 7130 7082
2001 11751 11506
Portugal 2001 260 246
Spain 2001 Not available 651
Sweden Per year 1996-2000 Not available 20
2002 6 0
United Kingdom Per year 1996-1999 800 600
2000 1100 Not available
2001 1134 Not available
* Authorisation granted for treatment abroad in general and not only within the EU.
6 See the amendment of Article 22 (2) of Reg. 1408771, inserted by Regulation 2793/81. 
7 Table from Martinsen 2005, based on Palm et al, 2000: 44-62; Mossialos et al, 2002: 85;
Commission Staff Working Paper 2003.
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In relation to Table 1, it is important to emphasise that these data only mir-
rors the part of patient mobility governed through the EU authorisation
procedure. In addition hereto, we have to consider the mobility governed
through the European health card, mobility governed by bilateral and inter-
national agreements as well as privately financed mobility. It has not been
possible to update the data contained in Table 1, although there is a great
need to get a more complete picture of patient mobility. Future research
should address the current state and future evolution of European patient
mobility, as the debate on impact and challenges would benefit from
comparable, quantitative insights. As for now, data remains scattered and
incomplete (Rosenmöller, McKee & Baeten 2006).
Until 1998, regulation 1408/71 was the only regulatory source for cross-
border treatment in the EU. The principles of the internal market had not
been applied to the health sector and were indeed politically held to be
inapplicable. However, ECJ judgements on the relationship between the
requirement of prior authorisation and EC law were serious enough to
upset the established status quo. 
In a series of judgements, the ECJ questioned the justification of ‘prior
authorisation’ and gradually established that the principles of the internal
market – and especially Article 49 of the Treaty - also applied to national
health policies.8 The Court first laid down that healthcare was a service
within the meaning of the Treaty.9 The requirement of prior authorisation
was, in principle, found to be a barrier to free movement. The immediate
impact of the 1998 judgements was, however, modest in that they con-
sidered only a limited scope of non-hospital care (a pair of spectacles and
dental treatment), and concerned the reimbursement-based Luxembourg
healthcare system. 
In subsequent rulings, the ECJ extended its interpretation across the full
range of EU healthcare systems. The Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms judge-
ments of 200110 repeated – this time with regard to the Dutch ‘benefit in
kind’ health insurance system – that prior authorisation constitutes a
barrier to the free movement of services. Such a barrier may, however, be
justified provided that:
8 For a more detailed description of the series of judgements, see Martinsen (2005).
9 In the cases C-120/95, Decker, 28 April 1998 and C-158/96, Kohll, 28 April 1998. 
10 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, 12 July 2001.
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• The decision on whether or not to grant treatment abroad is based on
“international medical science”; and
• an equivalent course of treatment can be provided in the competent mem-
ber state without “undue delay” taking into consideration the medical
condition of the patient, broadly defined.
The Court further restricted the discretion to grant prior authorisation by
emphasising that it can only be a justified barrier to the principle of free
movement if it is based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria known in
advance so that national authorities cannot control the procedure arbitrarily.
Requests for authorisation must furthermore be dealt with within a reason-
able time, and refusals to grant authorisation must be open to appeal (para.
90, C-157/99).
The third step towards an internal healthcare market took place two years
later with the case of Müller-Fauré & Van Riet.11 In this case, the Court
issued yet another expansive interpretation by introducing a distinction
between hospital and non-hospital care. In the case of hospital care, the
Court restated its view that the requirement for prior authorisation is justi-
fied on condition that it is exercised proportionately and that the national
authority has no scope for acting in an arbitrary manner. The matter was,
however, quite different for non-hospital care. The Court laid down that
national authorisation constitutes an unjustified barrier to the free move-
ment of services for non-hospital care. Given the increasingly blurred
distinction between hospital and non-hospital care, the future implications
of this judgement are likely to be extensive. 
From Decker/Kohll via Smits/Peerbooms to Müller-Fauré it is clear that
legal judgements have made a significant contribution to the integration of
healthcare. Within a time span of only five years, national health policies
have been taken far further into the internal market than politicians ever
intended, or could have predicted. That EC law applies regardless of the
organising characteristics of national healthcare systems has been made
explicit in the recent case of Watts, where the Court, for the first time,
considered a national health system providing treatment free of charge,
funded through general taxation. 
11 Case C-385/99, 13 May 2003. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ
Zorgverzekeringen and Van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO
Zorgverzekeringen. ECR 2003, p. I-04509.
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2.1 The European Patient in Focus
On 16 May 2006, the ECJ’s long-awaited decision in the Watts case was
released. The case is more significant (and controversial) for state-funded
national health systems that provide healthcare as a benefit in kind, such
as those of the UK, Ireland, the Scandinavian countries and Southern
member states than for the insurance-funded systems such as that of
the Netherlands or systems based on the reimbursement of costs as in
Luxembourg. The Watts case considers, for the first time, the implications
of the logic of the internal market, for member states that generally sepa-
rate the provision of healthcare from market considerations. 
The case concerned a hip replacement needed by Mrs. Yvonne Watts, a
resident in the United Kingdom. Mrs. Watts requested authorisation to
receive treatment abroad. In the context of her application, the examining
consultant stated that Mrs. Watts was in no more need of a hip replace-
ment than any of the other patients on his waiting list and that the case
was in fact routine, and Mrs. Watts was told that she would have to wait
approximately one year for her operation. However, upon re-examination,
the consultant recommended that she be operated on within three to four
months, as her situation had now deteriorated. Despite this reduction in
waiting time, Mrs. Watts went to France to have her hip replacement and,
on her return, requested reimbursement of her costs of £ 3,900. In October
2003, the High Court in England and Wales rejected her application stating
that the reduction in her waiting time would have meant that Mrs. Watts
would have been treated without ‘undue delay’. Mrs. Watts took her case
to the Court of Appeal which, in turn, referred a long list of questions to
the ECJ.12
In its judgement, the ECJ confirms, and indeed furthers, its previous line of
health-related judgements. The conclusions remove the scope for national
institutions to exercise administrative discretion and bring the rights of the
European patient into sharper focus. In so doing, it intervenes in the national
sphere of governance. Furthermore, the Court equips the European patient
with institutional structures to claim those rights. 
Once again the Court stated that, regardless of individual features, all
medical services are ‘services’ within the meaning of the Treaty: 
12 The Court of Appeal in England and Wales referred no less than 7 questions to the ECJ
regarding among other matters whether Article 49 of the Treaty applies to an institution
such as the NHS; under what circumstances a refusal to authorise treatment abroad may be
justified; and what the proper meaning of undue delay is.
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It should be noted in that regard that, according to settled case-law, medical
services provided for consideration fall within the scope of the provisions on
the freedom to provide services […] there being no need to distinguish between
care provided in a hospital environment and care provided outside such an
environment (para 86 of the judgment). 
On the basis of this reasoning, the Court clarified that the characteristics
of the UK National Health Service do not exempt it from EC law. Article
49 of the Treaty applies regardless of the way the national system is
organised (paragraph 90 of the judgement). The last bastion for resisting
the general applicability of the Court’s previous judgements was rejected
by this judgement, since the whole range of European healthcare systems
and services now must be interpreted against the requirements of EC law. 
Although the Court does not specify when the waiting time for a particular
course of treatment might be considered to be ‘undue delay’ or beyond ‘the
time normally necessary’ – and thus constitute an unjustifiable barrier to
the principles of the internal market – it does, however, set out a (review-
able) criterion for determining whether a period of waiting is acceptable in
the context of EC law. This is that the waiting time must not:
exceed the period which is acceptable on the basis of an objective medical
assessment of the clinical needs of the person concerned in the light of all of
the factors characterising his medical condition at the time when the request for
authorisation is made or renewed, as the case may be (paragraph 79 of the
judgement).
Furthermore, the decision as to whether the patient faces undue delay in
accessing services must be based on: 
an objective medical assessment of the patient’s medical condition, the history
and probable course of his illness, the degree of pain he is in and/or the nature
of his disability at the time when the request for authorisation was made or
renewed (paragraph 119 of the judgement).
Thus, having enhanced the rights of the European patient by setting limits
to the time period and the grounds on which the exercise of supranational
rights can be put on hold, the Court went on to specify the institutional
structures that member states must provide to protect those rights. The
Court repeats the conclusions from Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms as well as
Müller-Fauré and van Riet, stating that the requirement for prior authorisa-
tion cannot legitimise discretionary decisions by national authorities, but
must be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria and allow for deci-
sions on authorisation to be challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceed-
ings (paragraphs 115-116). Notably, the Court goes beyond a restatement of
precedent and extends the obligation of member states to provide trans-
parency and legal certainty to European citizens: 
19
To that end, refusals to grant authorisation, or the advice on which such refusals
may be based, must refer to the specific provisions on which they are based and
be properly reasoned in accordance with them. Likewise, courts or tribunals
hearing actions against such refusals must be able, if they consider it necessary
for the purpose of carrying out the review which it is incumbent on them to
make, to seek the advice of wholly objective and impartial independent experts”
(paragraph 117 of the judgement). 
The Watts case thus strengthens the position of the European patient. Not
only has s/he been granted rights beyond national borders, but s/he has also
been provided with a structure and judicial procedures through which to
bypass the national system or challenge its decisions. The response to this
judgement by EU citizens, private interests, national courts and member
state governments will decide the next steps in the future development of
patients’ rights and the structures to guarantee them.
2.2 Current Access to Cross-Border Healthcare
The current situation for those wishing to access cross-border welfare
is rather complex in that they have different access points and that a
considerable part of the European healthcare rights are based on a series
of case-law rulings by the ECJ, but still have to take the restrictions of
national legislation into account. In general there is a considerable lack of
legal clarity and transparency. However, information on the complex of
rights is increasingly becoming available in a more coherent way, commu-
nicated from authoritative Community sources. Recently, the European
Commission Unit on the Coordination of Social Security Schemes within
DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities has launched a
new webpage providing an accessible and good overview of the different
rights and requirements when seeking healthcare treatment in another
member state.13
From a citizen’s perspective an advantage of the webpage is that it pro-
vides an overview of the different routes for unforeseen as well as planned
treatment. Besides giving the overview, it makes it possible for the individ-
ual patient to question the objective grounds of a refusal to have the costs
of treatment in another member state reimbursed or the refusal to be granted
prior authorisation to have a planned course of treatment carried out
abroad. It also gives an overview of different rules of reimbursement.
13 The webpage is available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_security_schemes/healthcare/index_en.htm
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Figure 2: Meeting Cross-Border Health Care Costs14
It should be expected that the webpage provided by the Commission
will in itself lead to more questions and complaints from citizens to the
European Commission and to national authorities. It should also be expected
that transnational and different national, public or private, agencies will be
established to intermediate patients’ cross border rights. So far, this type of
intermediation seems scarce. However, it is evident that the development
opens up for patient organisations, welfare groups and, indeed, private
agencies to collate reliable information and carry out the preparatory work
to find suitable cross-border treatment. Such agencies could provide the
necessary and comparable information on the efficiency, quality and costs
of the foreign supply as well as information on the obligations of the
competent national institutions. This kind of intermediation would be
likely to give new and considerable dynamics to the current development.
Such European healthcare intermediation agencies may be the key missing
link today. Their absence hinders the spread of information.     
14 Source: European Commission, Unit on Coordination of Social Security Schemes
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_security_schemes/healthcare/e112/pdf/
schema_en.pdf
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2.3 Future Supranational Healthcare Steps
When the European Court of Justice issued its Decker and Kohll rulings,
politicians reacted forcefully. The German Government, for example,
initially spoke out very strongly against the judgements. The former
German Minister of Health, Seehofer, argued quite impetuously in the
wake of the judgements, saying that the member states had to overturn the
rulings through a Treaty amendment and that Germany would not comply
with the premises of the judgements (Langer 1999c, p. 54; Børsen, 7. May
1998; Politiken 9 June 1998). The former Minister found the Decker/Kohll
case-law revolutionary and argued that if Germany adopted its premises, it
would be a long-term threat to the sustainability of the German health
system (Spiegel 17/98, Fokus from 4 May 1998; Schaaf 1999, p. 274;
Eichenhofer 1999a, p. 114; Eichenhofer 1999b, p. 2; Interview, Deutsche
Verbindungsstelle, 18 September 2001).   
This initial outburst is in sharp contrast to the subsequent political
response as nothing further happened. The member states evidently waited
for the Commission to take the lead and point out some kind of direction
between political opposition and the different positions. 
A first step came when the Commission, rather unsuccessfully, attempted
to integrate the healthcare area in the proposal for a Directive on services
in the internal market.15 As a precise reproduction of the Court’s decisions,
Article 23 of the new directive proposed 1) an internal market for non-
hospital care, where the patient has a right to seek treatment in another
member state without prior authorisation and subsequently have the costs
reimbursed by the competent national institution, 2) a right to hospitalisa-
tion in another member state, provided that the member state of affilia-
tion offers the same treatment and that authorisation has been granted
beforehand. The health ministers, however, refused to have their policy
area regulated as part of a general Directive on services, placed under the
responsibility of DG Internal Market. Article 23, and thus the healthcare
area, was taken out of the Directive. 
Consequently it appeared clear that European healthcare could not be
regulated from an overall internal market perspective, but the judicial inte-
gration still called for political codification and more transparency. In
September 2006, DG Health (SANCO) communicated a consultation pro-
cedure on health services.16 The Communication called for stakeholders’
15 COM (2004) 2, 5 March 2004. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Services in the Internal Market.
16 The Communication is SEC (2006) 1195/4, 26 September 2006.
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contributions to state their opinions on a set of questions related to the free
movement of health services. The deadline for submitting the contributions
was 31 January 2007 and from here onwards it will be for DG SANCO
together with DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities,
DG Internal Market and, possibly, DG Competition to formulate a
Commission proposal (Interview, European Commission, February 2007).
Currently, it is difficult to state more exactly the timeframe for formulating
the proposal, but it may be submitted late summer or autumn 2007, or it
may take longer, depending on how the Commission evaluates the many
contributions and the extent to which the involved DGs are able to estab-
lish a consensus between them (interview, ibid). 
The Communication begins by giving a kind of status on healthcare integra-
tion so far and the need to clarify developments to the public and national
administrations. It is interesting to note that the Communication emphasises
that previous case-law has developed two guiding principles (SEC (2006)
1195/4, p. 4): 
– “Any non-hospital care to which a person is entitled in their own
Member State they may also seek in any other Member State without
prior authorisation, and be reimbursed up to the level of reimbursement
provided by their own system
– Any hospital care to which they are entitled in their own Member State
they may also seek in any other Member State provided they first have
authorisation of their own system. This authorisation must be given if
their system cannot provide them care within a medically acceptable
time limit considering their condition. They will be reimbursed up to at
least the level of reimbursement provided by their own system” 
It seems clear that according to the Commission, the prevoius series
of case-law constitutes the binding state of art within the field. The
Communication states that “The Court’s rulings on these individual cases
are clear in themselves, and no precondition may be required for the exer-
cise of the rights of patients recognised by the Court. However, it is neces-
sary to improve clarity to ensure a more general and effective application
of freedoms to receive and provide health services” (SEC (2006) 1195/4,
p. 4). 
Aiming at establishing such transparency, as well as a more general and
effective application, the Commission poses a set of questions for stake-
holders to respond to. These are:
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Questions posed to stakeholders by the European Commission in SEC
(2006) 1195/4 
Question 1: what is the current impact (local, regional, national) of cross-
border health care on accessibility, quality and financial sustainability of
healthcare systems, and how might this evolve? 
Question 2: what specific legal clarification and what practical informa-
tion is required by whom (eg; authorities, purchasers, providers, patients)
to enable safe, high-quality and efficient cross-border healthcare?
Question 3: which issues (eg: clinical oversight, financial responsibility)
should be the responsibility of the authorities of which country? Are these
different for the different kinds of cross-border healthcare? 
Question 4: who should be responsible for ensuring safety in the case of
cross-border healthcare? If patients suffer harm, how should redress for
patients be ensured?
Question 5: what action is needed to ensure that treating patients from
other Member States is compatible with the provision of a balanced
medical and hospital services accessible to all (for example, by means of
financial compensation for their treatment in ‘receiving’ countries?
Question 6: are there further issues to be addressed in the specific context
of health services regarding movement of health professionals or
establishment of healthcare providers not already addressed by Community
legislation? 
Question 7: are there other issues where legal certainty should also be
improved in the context of each specific health or social protection 
system? In particular, what improvements do stakeholders directly involved
in receiving patients from other Member States – such as healthcare
providers and social security institutions – suggest in order to facilitate
cross-border healthcare? 
Question 8: in what ways should European action help support the health
systems of the Member States and the different actors within them?
Are these areas not identified above?
Question 9: what tools would be appropriate to tackle the different issues
related to health services at EU level? What issues should be addressed
through Community legislation and what through non-legislative means? 
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As many and vast as the questions are, as manifold and vast are the stake-
holders’ contributions.17 No less than 266 contributions were submitted.
Among the contributors are member states and EEA states, regional
authorities, national parliaments, national organisations, international
organisations, citizens, universities, and commercial organisations and
companies. The member states France, Bulgaria and Portugal did not
submit contributions. The different member states’ opinions and pre-
ferences will be compared and analysed in section 4 below. 
What is clear for the time being is that the different DGs involved in
formulating the proposal now have an immense task in analysing the
different viewpoints and deciding what to take into account and what to
leave out – and which precise balance to strike between internal market
principles and the protection of the individual characteristics of the national
health systems. By having initiated an open hearing process on broad
questions, the task of combining and selecting the many different opinions
and preferences will be anything but straightforward. 
17 The stakeholders’ contributions can be found at:
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_overview/co_operation/mobility/
results_open_consultation_en.htm
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3 EUROPEAN HEALTHCARE FAMILIES
European healthcare families mirror the different welfare models that
individual states have institutionalised over time. Models or typologies have
for a long time been used as comparative tools in welfare research. Back in
the 1950s, Wilensky developed the distinction between the residual and the
institutional welfare state. In 1971, the distinction was extended by Titmuss,
when he added the performance-oriented scheme as a third model. In 1990,
Esping-Andersen emphasised the ideological link of the three welfare ideal
types, and placed them in their broader political-economic contexts. The
residual welfare state referred to the liberal ideology, represented by the US
and United Kingdom among others. The institutional welfare state was main-
ly formed by social democracy, and was represented in the Scandinavian
states. The performance-oriented model was found in countries where con-
servative ideology had dominated such as in Germany, Austria, France and
Italy. The criteria for Esping-Andersen’s distinction between welfare models
was the extent of ‘de-commodification’ that each state granted its citizens,
meaning the degree to which the social security of the individual is
independent of market performance. 
In the mid-1990s Ferrera pointed out that there was a Southern welfare
model in Europe, characterised by ‘corporatist’ income maintenance, a low
degree of state involvement and persisting clientelism. However, for the
field of healthcare policy, the corporatist, income-reflecting path was
departed and replaced by the establishment of a National Health Service
based on universalistic principles (Ferrera 1996). Also the UK made a
healthcare departure from its residual welfare model, and established a
National Health Service on universalistic principles. 
Since then the EU has been enlarged from 15 to 25 to 27 member states.
The 10 new member states which were included in 2004 in general chose a
different healthcare path. Contrary to Southern Europe, the new member
states from Eastern Europe seem to have chosen the performance-oriented
or income maintenance model when it comes to healthcare. Slovakia, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia
now cover the main part of healthcare expenditure by using social insur-
ance contributions. However, the total funding of healthcare in most of the
countries relies on a mix of financing models, which besides contributions
also includes general taxation, voluntary insurance premiums and user
charges (Dubois & McKee 2004, p. 55). On the other hand, Cyprus and
Malta were historically subject to British influences. Here, general taxation
is the greatest financial source, but still amounts to less than 50% of health
expenditure. The tendency here is that out-of-pocket payments are the
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second most important financial source, supplemented by voluntary
premiums (Dubois & McKee Ibid.). Also informal payments/under the
table payments seem to constitute a significant part of healthcare financing
in some of the new member states. It is clear that such informal payments
have severe consequences on the effectiveness of the systems and public
policies, because the flow of resources into the system depend on the
willingness and need of patients to make informal payments (Dubois &
McKee 2004, pp. 49-50). Budgetary transparency, capacity planning and
equity are difficult to uphold in a system that in part relies on informal
payments. 
Officially the healthcare policy of the new member states provides universal
cover, but in some member states the population is covered to a varying
extent. Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have systems
that cover all permanent residents. Hungary, Lithuania and Poland differ
since entitlements are based on contributions. Cyprus is a third case, mak-
ing public healthcare restricted to government employees, families with
four or more children and low-income households. Higher income groups
are charged for access to public healthcare (Dubois & McKee 2004, p. 59). 
EU healthcare families can analytically be divided into two typologies/
basic institutional designs (Ferrera 2005, p. 124). A model organised as a
National Health Service covering the residing population universally and
another organised as a social insurance/Bismarkian model, around perform-
ance or income-reflecting criteria. A main characteristic of the National
Health Service system is that healthcare rights are granted on the basis of
residence (Cornelissen 1997, p. 32). A person is entitled to healthcare
because s/he is a citizen or a habitual resident, and not qua individual con-
tributions paid to a specific scheme. Healthcare expenditure is generally
financed by taxes. Yet, tax payment is not a requirement to receive a
specific social benefit (Ketcher 1998, pp. 254-255). On the other hand, a
main characteristic of the social insurance model is generally that market
participation gives access to a social security scheme, including healthcare
and the degree of this participation decides the level of entitlements. 
Although dividing European health models into typologies/healthcare
families hardly does justice to the many nuances of each individual model,
it is a useful way of emphasising how national health institutions diverge
across Europe and places the individual models respectively in comparison
with their European counterparts. The table below divides the families
primarily according to financial models, as this is held to be decisive when
discussing impacts from internal market principles: 
27
3.1 The Principle of Territoriality
Across the different families, healthcare is built on the principle of terri-
toriality. The territorial closure serves to ensure compulsory inclusion and
broad risk-sharing (Ferrera 2005, p. 126). The justification of the principle
as an instrument of governance is to be found in the long history of the
welfare state. The formation and consolidation of modern social policies
took place within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. Welfare
policy was, and remains, closely related to the concept of the nation-state
(Eichenhofer 2001, p. 55). The welfare state inherited the nation-state way
of defining entitlement with its strong emphasis on territoriality. The wel-
fare state has traditionally been in a sovereign position to require that
social benefits and services are distributed and consumed within its terri-
Table 2: Health Care Supply in EU-2518
Social Insurance National Health Service
Reimbursement Benefits in Kind Benefits in Kind 19
• Luxembourg • Germany • United Kingdom,
• Belgium • Austria • Ireland
• France • Netherlands20 • Denmark
• Czech Republic • Denmark
• Slovakia • Finland
• Hungary • Spain
• Poland • Portugal
• Slovenia • Italy
• Estonia • Greece
• Lithuania • Latvia
• Cyprus
• Malta
18 The table for EU-15 draws on Langer 1999, p. 358; Palm 2000, p. 17; Martinsen 2004,
p. 290 & Ferrera 2005, p. 125. The 10 new member states have been placed in the typology
on the basis of the MISSOC Info 02/2004 “Social Protection in the 10 New Member States”
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/missoc_info_en.htm#01/2006
19 ‘The national health, benefits in kind systems’ may have reimbursement for certain
services and the instrument of reimbursement may have increased over the last year,
but reimbursement is not a general characteristic. 
20 The new health insurance act which entered into force in 2006 in the Netherlands has
introduced a significant reimbursement policy. However, it still does not appear as a general
characteristic and hence the Netherlands is still included in the category ‘Social insurance,
benefit in kind system’.
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tory (Leibfried & Pierson 1995). Alongside that of social citizenship,21 the
principle of territoriality has defined the scope and reach of European wel-
fare. 
Social legislation in the EU member states remains largely based on the
principle of territoriality. (Haverkate & Huster 1999, p. 115). Even in a
‘globalised’ world, the principle finds political justification, although, as
will be demonstrated below, the principle has recently been modified in
some member states. Social benefits and services are designed to address
domestic policy aims and correspond to domestic living conditions and
costs (Tegtmeier 1990, p. 29; Clever 1992, p. 300). Above all, the principle
of territoriality provides an effective means of national control:
• It ensures budgetary control, by restricting benefits and services to
people who reside and/or are present within the national borders.
• It ensures that the policy objective is pursued in practice by, for example,
monitoring that long-term care benefits are in fact used to purchase care
and that family benefits meet policy intentions.
• It serves as a means of controlling the quality of services through
nationally defined standards.
• It facilitates capacity planning, ruling out the need to take account of
foreign provision. 
The principle of territoriality is one of the basic organising features on
which modern welfare has been established but it is increasingly challenged
by European integration and the enforcement of internal market principles. 
21 Social citizens were traditionally those who were members of the nation. Concepts such as
equality and solidarity were not unlimited, but restricted to members of the nation. T. H.
Marshall’s depiction of ‘social citizenship’ stands to date as the one that is perhaps most
referred to. He wrote: “Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a
community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with
which the status is endowed” (Marshall 1950, p. 18).
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4 ON IMPACTS AND CHALLENGES – EUROPEAN
HEALTHCARE MODELS FACING CHANGE?
It is clear that the healthcare systems of EU-25 face a set of common
challenges, such as demographic ageing which will severely challenge the
balance of public health expenditure. Another common challenge is con-
stituted in the improvements and innovations of new medical technology
which demands more advanced and possibly more expensive forms of
treatments. 
This set of common challenges has inarguably nothing directly to do with
the European Union. However, as the European Union gradually, but
increasingly, has become involved in an internal market of healthcare
demands and supplies, the polity also guides and interferes in the future
developments of the sector. 
Furthermore, the European Union may in its own right challenge and
motivate change in the healthcare sectors of its member states. In its initial
phase, the development introduces market logics into the healthcare sector
and thus introduces different means of allocating resources more
efficiently across borders. In this way, the internal market development
challenges those member states which do not provide sufficiently high
levels of healthcare quality or do not have sufficiently effective healthcare
supply. By inviting patients to choose by exit rather than solely through
traditional democratic voice, quality standards or ineffective supply are no
longer pure national choices. By interpreting and applying internal market
principles, the European Union has granted the Union citizens an opt-out
possibility or an exit option from the national system. Until the judicial
activism in the late 1990s, this option did not exist, superseded as it was
by the national principles of territoriality as a way for the national authori-
ties to steer and control their healthcare sector. 
4.1 What Motivates Patients’ Choice – Micro level
The case-law development has directly compromised the organising principle
of territoriality. The territorial restriction of healthcare consumption has
been severely questioned by the constitutionalised principles of free move-
ment in the Union. However, examining the financial impact on the health-
care budgets of this development and the substantive impact on the con-
tents of the different healthcare packages requires a different set of ques-
tions. 
In the their contributions to the open consultation regarding Community
action on health services, the member states’ response to question no. 1,
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which concerns impact, is quite similar.22 They note that the current impact
in terms of actual patient mobility across member state borders is rather
limited. Some member states note that there is no comparable or ex-
haustive statistics for patient mobility, but that it is ‘relatively small’. The
member states, however, also emphasise that they expect patient mobility
to increase in the future, most notably in the border regions. 
One part of the analytical work for this report has been to consider dif-
ferent set of factors that might motivate patient mobility and thus influence
the future scope of cross border healthcare. However, the relevant factors
depend on which type of healthcare we are discussing. In terms of the
motivation behind patients’ choice, there appear to be two overall types of
healthcare benefits and services; 1) Public benefits where the patients co-
finance a part, 2) Public benefits provided for free, i.e. paid fully by the
public budget or public health insurance. Patients are likely to be motivated
differently in relation to the two healthcare benefit types when they decide
whether to stay in their competent member state for treatment, i.e. where
they are insured, or opt for treatment in another member state. 
In contemporary healthcare, the two benefit types are not just found in
separate sectors, so that the benefits with a share of private co-payment are
provided outside the hospital sector and the others inside the hospital
sector. The financing form is more mixed today since, for example, hospitals
require co-payment for bed-days and night care in some member states, and
other member states provide non-hospital care fully free of charge. 
Table 3: Factors Affecting Patient Choice
Factors motivating patient mobility
Public benefits with • Economic motivation
privately co-financed part • Efficiency of supply (waiting time)
• Quality of supply
• Accessible and transparent information 
• Individual risk adversity 
• EU rules. Content and transparency
Public benefits provided • Efficiency of supply (waiting time)
free of charge • Quality of supply
• Accessible and transparent information 
• Individual risk adversity 
• EU rules. Content and transparency
22 For the contributions, see http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_overview/co_operation/mobility/
results_open_consultation_en.htm
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Whereas the patient, or the health consumer, may be motivated to seek
treatment abroad primarily for financial reasons when s/he has to finance
a part of the service her/himself, there are likely to be a set of additional
reasons behind the choice besides the economic rationale such as if the
service can be provided effectively and with sufficient quality. Further-
more, the information factor is likely to play a major role. As a consumer
area, healthcare must be held to be highly risk sensitive or risk averse
since personal health is at stake, and hence choice depends on information
to a great extent, but also on individual risk adversity. Information may be
largely personal between individuals, creating either negative or positive
information chains/spirals on the basis of personal experience. However,
information may spur as an internal health market becomes more institu-
tionalised, building up different platforms which spread information
at a more institutionalised level. Such ‘platforms’ are private clinics and
hospitals, national social security institutions and Commission DGs, detail-
ing Community rules. The new webpage of the European Commission’s
Unit on the Coordination of Social Security Schemes, described in section
2 above, provides an example of such an information platform. As also
emphasised in section 2, the Community information platform is likely to
become increasingly supplemented by privately or publicly established
intermediation agencies which offer comparable information to patients on
the efficiency, quality and costs of cross-border healthcare supplies as well
as information on the Community obligations of the competent national
institutions. Finally, the development of EU rules stands out as a factor
which influences patient mobility. The specific content but also the
transparency of European rules have an impact on the extent to which
Union citizens find it reliable and a sufficient basis upon which to make
cross-border choices. European rules are unlikely to be a dominant factor
motivating cross-border choices as long as there is a lack of legal clarity. 
For the other category, i.e. public benefits provided free of charge, the set
of factors motivating choice are generally similar except that the economic
rationale is irrelevant as an individual motivation. Supply efficiency, in
terms of waiting time for individual forms of treatment, and supply quality
are likely to become the main motivating factors instead. Moreover, for
this kind of healthcare benefit, the accessibility and transparency of
information is likely to be decisive since risk adversity is assumed to be
high. Furthermore, the content and transparency of EU rules must be
significant to cross-border patient choice. For both categories of benefits,
it is in particular the lack of institutionalised and transparent information
and the lack of legal clarity concerning EU rules which are the two factors
likely to at least partly explain why patient mobility remains relatively low.
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By the same token, we must expect that as information and Community
rules become more accessible and clear this will in itself spur patient
mobility.
4.2 What Motivates Patients’ Choice – Policy Level
Health policies differ across EU-25. As illustrated in Table 2 above, there
are two general typologies rooted in different welfare models; social insur-
ance versus national health services. Whereas the latter generally provides
healthcare as benefits in kind, the former diverges between those social
insurance systems providing benefits in kind and those where the social
insurance institution subsequently reimburses the costs of care to the
insured. 
Furthermore, member states differ with regard to their individual health-
care packages. Article 152 (5) of the Treaty lays down that the quality and
extent of healthcare services are the competences of the member states. It
has been important for member states to emphasise that the content of the
national healthcare supply falls beyond the scope of Community com-
petences. This was the political message to the Court and the Commission
when the member states overruled the Court’s Pierik decisions in the late
1970s through Regulation 2793/81 – and this is emphasised by several
member states in the contributions to the Commission’s open consultation
on health services. 
Nevertheless, both the scope of the national healthcare packages and the
quality thereof may indirectly be challenged by greater healthcare
exchange across borders. Patients – and voters – will compare the health-
care system and supply of their neighbour state as well as the quality. With
extended cross-border information and experience, voters will increasingly
require what they provide ‘next door’ and it will be difficult for politicians
to justify lower national standards. 
Such ‘bottom-up’ demands for best quality and standards may be supported
by EU soft law measures to compare the quality and safety between the
member states. It is interesting to note that some member states in their
contribution to the Commission’s open consultation on healthcare find that
in order to ensure cross-border healthcare, it is necessary to set up compar-
able basic standards of quality and patient safety (see the contributions of
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia). The Netherlands goes as far
as noting that it is in favour of exploring how to set up minimum standards
for care quality at the European level. 
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It is evident that ensuring patient mobility is not a matter of a single isolated
European policy objective. In the logic of issue linking, it is evident that
ensuring patient mobility and overcoming national obstacles implies a long
list of interlinked policies. If quality is not comparable using certain similar
standards, the Community will not be able to realize patient mobility. It is
therefore likely that the Commission initiative will propose how to work
out minimum comparable standards across the member states, possibly
beginning with soft measures such as the open method of coordination.   
The policy level is furthermore decisive to the economic rationale behind
patient motivation to go abroad. The economic rationale becomes decisive
when the patient has to co-finance a part of the healthcare service or
benefit. National policies decide the extent to which user charges co-
finance which benefits and services. User charges differ across EU-25 and
across the two typologies; social insurance and national health services,
while in some member states, user charges are currently significant for
access to healthcare services. In other member states, co-payments have
been introduced but the amount that the user has to pay remains at a more
symbolic level and has been introduced primarily to avoid overconsump-
tion. However, we expect that since national healthcare systems will gradu-
ally have to adapt to the financial challenges caused by demographic age-
ing, more advanced technology and increased health demands from voters
(voice), user charges will become an increasingly important method for
healthcare funding. 
On the basis of MISSOC data a table on the different use of healthcare
user charges in EU-25 has been compiled and placed in the Appendix. The
Appendix illustrates the extent to which user charges co-finance health
expenditure and differs across the two typologies of national health service
systems and social insurance systems. It is clear that a group of member
states; Spain, Malta, Ireland, the UK, the Czech Republic, Lithuania have a
minimal use of user charges in public health. On the other hand, for a
more numerous group of member states co-payment appears to be a fairly
important financial instrument, when for example a stay in hospital is user
charged. These countries are France, Austria, Germany, Luxembourg,
Slovakia, Slovenia Estonia and Latvia, but also in the national health
service systems of Finland and Sweden co-payment has come to play a
role. However, measured against the level of total costs, user charges
remain at a relatively low level in the latter states and foremost aims at dis-
couraging overconsumption. For member states where co-payment plays a
prominent role for certain services, the economic rationale to explore the
health supply of other member states is clearly present. Also in the
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member states where ‘under the table payments’ are considerable, the
economic rationale to go abroad and have the expenses covered by the
public purse is likely to intensify. 
Furthermore, as the comparison of user charges in the Appendix makes
clear, that although there is co-payment for a stay in hospital, co-payment is
foremost characteristic for non-hospital care. If we assume that a patient’s
motivation to receive cross-border healthcare is greater if s/he can save
money, then user charges tell us within which treatment types we should
expect the economic rationale to play a role. The earlier Decker/Kohll
judgements spurred the cross-border exchange of dental services and
healthcare goods such as eyeglasses. Similar cross-border specialisation
could be expected in other forms of ambulant treatment, which are not pro-
vided for free in all member states, or may not even be provided by the state
in some member states. Different forms of spa treatments are forms of
healthcare in which public systems in some member states are advanced and
specialised, but which are not recognised in other member states. Some of
the new member states have actively started to attract patients from other
member states in specific niches of healthcare supply. One such example is
Slovenia, which has developed extra capacity in orthopaedics, spa treatment,
plastic and gynaecological surgery to meet specific demands from patients
from other member states (McKee, MacLehose & Albreht 2004, p. 172). 
Fertilisation is another healthcare area of growing public importance.
Fertilisation is more accessible, efficiently carried out, offered using different
advanced techniques and perhaps less politically regulated in some
member states than in others. Abortion is another treatment area where
political regulation differs remarkably across the member states, prohibited
in some member states if not carried out for medical reasons, legal in other
member states but up to different months of pregnancy. From a de facto
point of view, patient mobility gives European citizens more equal rights to
terminate pregnancy. In practical terms, it will be more difficult for, for
example, the Swedish or Danish health systems to reject a Polish citizen –
on the basis of her European health insurance card – access to abortion.
Concrete medical, ethical questions will increasingly be formulated
through practice where European citizens exit their national regulations
and opt for the more suitable options in another member state and may
therefore also impact on diverse public values. Such moves do not respect
the ethical boundaries of individual member states and increasingly call for
political clarifications at Community level.  
The free movement provisions of the EU means in practice that the former
voice of patients as voters have been supplemented by a cross-border exit
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opportunity, which increasingly will make it difficult to pursue an isolated
national health policy without seriously considering what they provide next
door.  
4.3 The Position of Member States – Political Level
When analysing the member state responses to the internal market implica-
tions on national health systems, responses have been uncoordinated,
dispersed and reluctant. Far from all member states have implemented the
case-law of the ECJ and those which have done so have based their imple-
mentation on their national re-interpretation of the meaning and impact of
the Court’s rulings. 
Denmark was one of the first member states to respond to the Decker and
Kohll interpretations of the Court. In the wake of the rulings, the Danish
Government set up an inter-ministerial working group to interpret the sub-
stance and scope of the Court’s statements. The working group published a
report on the consequences of the rulings, which formed the basis on
which national policy was subsequently amended. In its report, the work-
ing group admitted that the Decker/Kohll rulings implied general premises.
For this reason, the report accepted that their scope exceeded the individual
lawsuits. The Danish report, however, revised its interpretation of ‘service’.
The Danish viewpoint was that for a service to be a service according to
the meaning of Article 50 of the Treaty (ex. Article 60), there must be an
element of remuneration: 
It is the view of the working group that if, on the other hand, the treatment had
been provided by the public hospital sector, Article 49 of the Treaty would not
have applied. The reason is that Article 50 defines services as services normally
carried out in return for remuneration [...]What characterises a service is thus
that a service provider offers a service in return for remuneration” (Danish
Report on the Decker/Kohll rulings 1999, p. 23. Own translation, emphasis
added).
The Danish (re-)interpretation of the ‘service’ concept meant that the vast
majority of Danish healthcare services fell outside the definition, since
they are provided as benefits in kind, free of charge and thus with no
direct remuneration involved. Denmark conceded the Decker and Kohll
procedure to have a discernible impact, but the national definition of what
constituted a service in the meaning of the Treaty allowed the entire public
hospital sector, as well as all types of non-hospital care provided free of
charge, to be exempt. However, the conclusions in the report led to a policy
reform, which came into effect on 1 July 2000 and allowed certain services
to be purchased abroad with subsequent fixed reimbursement from the
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relevant Danish institutions. The policy reform made it possible to pur-
chase general and specialist medical treatment and dental assistance for
persons insured under group 2,23 physiotherapy, and chiropractic treatments
abroad.24
The subsequent cases, C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, have also
led to changes in national healthcare legislation in Denmark. Since 1 July
2002, Danish patients have had the right to receive treatment outside the
contracted public hospitals in the event that these are unable to provide the
necessary treatment within two months. The purpose of this policy reform
was to shorten waiting lists and give patients a certain freedom of choice
where the public health supply was insufficient. This health policy reform
represented an institutionalisation of an obligation to refer patients to non-
contracted healthcare providers in the event that public care could not be
provided within the specified time limit. However, the freedom to reform
national health policy had been restricted beforehand by the ECJ judicial
ruling in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, where the Court clarified that the
principle of non-discrimination means that once treatment cannot be pro-
vided by the contracted national provider, the member state is not allowed
to favour a nationally established, non-contracted, i.e. private, provider over
a provider in another member state. In the remarks proposing the national
policy reform, its relation to EC law was clear:
The European Court of Justice has in a judgement dated 12 July 2001 (C-157/99)
taken a stand on certain EU judicial questions regarding hospital treatment. The
Court has stated that hospitalisation is a part of the provisions on the free
movement of services of the EC Treaty. The need for planning and cost contain-
ment may, however, justify certain restrictions in access to treatment paid by the
public health service or through health insurance. Such rules shall, however, be
objective, proportional and non-discriminatory. Supposedly, that implies that
when access to publicly paid treatment is given to ‘independent’ hospitals out-
side public control and planning, as is the case in the present legislative pro-
posal, access must be provided on an equal footing with hospitals in other
EU member states. The legislative proposal complies with the judgement
(Legislative proposal L 64, proposed 29 January 2002. Adopted 19 March
2002. Own translation.).
23 Denmark has two categories of health coverage. The insured person chooses if he wants to
belong to Group 1, under which he is entitled to free medical care, but only from the
assigned doctor or from a specialist assigned by the generalist. If the person wants to belong
to Group 2, he chooses doctor and specialist freely, but has to pay a part of the costs
himself. Group 1 is the most popular choice. Only about 1.6% of all Danish residents are
insured under Group 2 (Interview, the Danish Ministry of Health, 3 April 2001;
Danish Report on the Decker/Kohll cases 1999, p. 37).
24 The policy reform entered into force for law no. 467 of 31 May 2000 and BEK no. 536
of 15 June 2000.
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From 1 October 2007, the maximum waiting time for treatment in the
Danish health system will be further reduced – from two months to one
month. This means that after one month of waiting, the patient is entitled
to treatment in another member state. Denmark has thus narrowly defined
what it considers ‘undue delay’ and this further reduction in waiting time
must increase (considerably) healthcare treatment carried out outside
Denmark. It seems highly unlikely, at least at present, that the Danish
health system itself will be able to provide a comprehensive set of treat-
ments within one month. 
The German federal government responded somewhat later, namely in
2004, when the national health insurance law was adjusted to the ECJ rul-
ing on patient mobility.25 The health law reform meant that non-hospital
treatment carried out in another member state does not require prior
authorisation, but hospital treatment must still be authorised in advance.
The same health reform made it possible for health insurance funds to
contract Community service providers. Essentially the reform means
that health insured persons in Germany now have a greater choice of
Community service providers. It compromises the principle of territoriality,
but by extending the instrument of contracts beyond borders, the national
health insurance funds maintain a certain control over the quality and
standards of health supply.
Also the Netherlands has recently adopted a major healthcare reform
which implements the patient mobility case-law of the European Court and
which has a significant impact on the principle of territoriality.26 It grants
freedom of choice concerning supply and demand, also beyond national
borders. Moreover, the reform introduces worldwide cover through a prin-
ciple of reimbursement. Insured persons are entitled to make use of care
services covered by the basic health package anywhere in the world,
and will as a maximum be reimbursed the usual amount payable in the
Netherlands. The reform thus departs from the principle of territoriality. 
The fact that member states such as Germany and the Netherlands have
gone ahead and implemented the case-law of the Court may prove important
when the Commission negotiates the forthcoming proposal on patient
25 For the direct link between the reform of the national health insurance law and the ECJ
case-law, see the contribution from the German government to the Commission’s open
consultation regarding Community action on health services.
26 The Dutch Health Insurance Act entered into force at the beginning of 2006. For the direct
link between the reformed Dutch health insurance act and the ECJ case-law, see the
Contribution by the Dutch government to the Commission’s open consultation regarding
Community action on health services.
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mobility. These countries are thus likely to support a proposal which lies
close to the legal interpretations of the Court. 
4.3.1 Different political standpoints
When analysing the contributions made by the governments of the member
states to the Commission’s open consultation regarding Community action
on health services, it becomes evident how varied the political positions
are. Since the Commission will not be able to find a consensus among the
contributions, it must formulate a proposal built on a compromise on the
basis of split preferences. The fact that some member states actually favour
the development of extending European patient mobility and advocate
stronger patients’ rights and clarity will no doubt be important to the likeli-
hood for the Commission to have a successful outcome. 
From an overall perspective, where member states differ is whether they
believe that the case-law strikes the right balance between patients’ rights
and protecting the particularities of the national health systems or whether
they argue that the case-law is formulated too much in favour of the internal
market. 
The Commission has a strong ally in the Netherlands when it comes to
speaking in favour of transnational healthcare. The Netherlands sees a
redistributive bonus in the development of transnational healthcare. Cross-
border patient mobility can help to increase the efficient use of health
resources and the welfare of patients. The Netherlands is a strong advocate
of patients’ rights, arguing that the key issue of the initiative is how to
ensure patient safety and the quality of care. Clearer rules and better
information for patients are required. The Netherlands believes that the
European Union should seek to establish a readily accessible information
system to help patients make cross-border choices, for example on quality,
prices, reimbursement, payment by patients, waiting times etc. The impact
of such an EU centralised information platform for patients is in itself
likely to unleash healthcare from the national territory. 
The Netherlands regrets the current lack of legal certainty, but primarily
puts the blame on the member states for not having fulfilled their
Community obligations by implementing the case-law of the Court: 
This is because legal uncertainty is present not so much at European level, but
at national level where member states do not incorporate case law into national
legislation. The Netherlands believes that complying with case law is important
because it contributes to striking a balance between the interests of individual
patients and those of the healthcare system as a whole. The Netherlands believes
that member states should incorporate case law into their national systems. It
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has done this in designing its own new healthcare system. Where other member
states incorporate ECJ case law insufficiently, the primary solution seems to be
for the Commission to institute infringement proceedings against them …  
Other member states’ contributions also speak strongly in favour of
patients’ rights (see for example the contributions of Finland, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Spain). In fact, it is striking that the member states’ con-
tributions in general focus more on patients’ rights and transparency than
they speak in favour of status quo and the protection of the national
systems. The case for the Commission will be to argue the initiative as
necessary to ensure patients’ rights and - eventually in the light of the
current legitimacy crisis – as an important means to lend substance to the
idea of a Europe for the citizens. 
However, concerns and opposing views are voiced in the contributions too.
On analysing the different member states’ positions, it becomes clear that
‘older’ member states (i.e. EU-15) are foremost concerned about a) the
distinction made by the Court between non-hospital and hospital care and
b) the definition of ‘undue delay’, whereas ‘newer’ member states (i.e. EU-
10) especially voice concerns about c) how to ensure the health quality and
efficiency of their systems for the national populations if the inflow of
foreign patients continues to increase. The contributions mirror the fact
that the member states see challenges in different dimensions, which is not
due to the healthcare model as such but rather to
a) its way of providing healthcare as outpatient or inpatient care; 
b) its way of planning capacity, with or without waiting lists; and 
c) the costs of the national systems. 
4.3.2 Non-hospital versus hospital care
The member states of Germany, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the UK, the
Czech Republic and Belgium emphasise that the ECJ distinction between
hospital and non-hospital care is far from sufficient. It is clear that the
member states find that the cost-control of non-hospital healthcare might
be severely challenged if outpatient treatment could be provided in other
member states and reimbursed nationally without the control mechanism of
prior authorisation. Furthermore, it is pointed out that hospital care has
different connotations in different member states. There is a need for
further clarification regarding when prior authorisation is justified under
Community law.
The Danish Government takes quite a defensive stand on this point. It
finds it decisive to reconsider the distinction between hospital and non-
hospital care. Denmark emphasises that non-hospital care may also in
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certain cases be very costly and demanding and require considerable
investments. Scanning provides such an example. It is therefore the view
of the Danish Government that as regards non-hospital treatment there are
objective considerations “that justify limitation of the free exchange of
healthcare services – i.e. cases in which a requirement of prior authorisa-
tion should be possible”. 
This concern is also voiced by the UK Government. The UK points out
that more forms of treatment are today provided as non-hospital care, since
many health systems have restructured so that more care is provided out-
side the hospital sector: 
We were surprised to see in the Commission’s Communication the statement
that the ECJ has ruled that people may seek ‘non-hospital’ care (to which they
are entitled to in their own Member State) in another Member State without
prior authorisation. We do not agree with what the Communication says on this
point. In fact the Court has said that it has yet to see a justification for a prior
authorisation system for non-hospital care. 
According to the UK, prior authorisation is also justified for non-hospital
care as it requires no less planning, funding, or careful management
than hospital care. It emphasises that it should be considered that many
member states have transferred more services from hospitals to primary
care settings. 
4.3.3 Undue delay
Fewer member states discuss the definition of ‘undue delay’. There seems
to be a disagreement in the contributions on the waiting time issue as to
whether ‘undue delay’ should rely on a Community or a national defini-
tion. It is essentially a question of which authoritative level has the com-
petence to define when delays in treatment are ‘undue’. The German con-
tribution points in the direction of a Community definition as it states that
further clarification is needed on “how long a waiting period must the
insured observe before being eligible for hospital treatment abroad”. On
the other hand, Sweden and the UK argue that ‘undue delay’ has already
been sufficiently clarified by the ECJ, which essentially means that it is the
medical situation of the patient and thus a national decision that will
decide when delay is “undue”. The UK refers to the Watts case, paragraph
119, emphasising that this is a sufficient definition of undue delay – and
that any attempts to further define the concept of undue delay contradicts
the logic of the ECJ case-law, “that it should always be clinically assessed
against the needs and circumstances of the individual”. 
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4.3.4 The positions of the newer member states –
different challenge perceptions
In the debate on the challenges and impacts of European patient mobility,
it has been argued that the new member states may benefit from the
development as they might attract patients from other member states by
offering price competitive treatment. It is clear that the new member states
have a competitive advantage concerning costs. The new member states
can provide treatment at a significantly lower cost than most of the older
member states. European differences in healthcare costs mirror foremost
the different costs of salaries. Salaries represent from 65% to 80% of
healthcare expenditure (McKee, MacLehose & Albreht 2004, p. 169). Even
when travel costs are taken into account, new member states can offer
treatment to patients from other member states at very competitive prices.
The significance of price differences is illustrated below in terms of
the costs of a hip replacement, provided in private hospitals established in
different member states: 
Table 4 – Charges for Hip Replacement Service in Private
Hospitals in Various European Countries (November 2002) 27
Country Cost of hip replacement (specialist fee, stay, surgery, prosthesis)
Belgium €6587 (European HealthNet)
Czech Republic €1754
France €4620 (European HealthNet)
Germany €7000 (through Medibroker)
Hungary €6600 (Budapest’s only private hospital)
Ireland €5605 (through European HealthNet)
Slovenia €5675 (results of a survey conducted in Slovenia in 2002)
Spain €4340 (European HealthNet)
UK €10640–14840 (BUPA Hospitals – range depends on type of prosthesis)
27 McKee, McLehose & Albreht 2004, p. 169.
However, low prices are primarily likely to attract patients if they have to
finance a part of the service themselves. Hence this kind of mobility from
older to newer member states is most likely to occur in the areas of health-
care where user charges play a role (see the table on user charges in
the Appendix and discussed above). Within these treatment sectors patient
mobility may have a growing impact. Dental treatment provides such an
example, where a certain mobility from Northern and Continental Europe
to Eastern member states such as Poland and Hungary is discernable.
Some of the new member states have also actively started to attract
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patients from other member states within other niches of healthcare supply
as the case of Slovenia shows (see above).
Despite these competitive advantages, Eastern European member states
regard patient mobility from quite a different perspective. Patient mobility
also goes the other way; from Eastern Europe to Continental, Southern and
Northern Europe. As European citizens, citizens from the newer member
states are entitled to a European health card and to apply for authorisation
according to the E112 procedure. This type of patient mobility is regulated
under Regulation 1408/71 (Regulation 883/2004), and the rules of reim-
bursement are that the costs of the member state where the treatment is
provided are reimbursed. If this member state happens to be Germany, the
UK, Denmark or for example Sweden, the price difference for the same
healthcare treatment between these states and a competent newer member
state is considerable indeed. This has been noted in among others the
Estonian contribution to the Commission’s open consultation. Estonia
notes that in 2005 the average cost per case of person insured and residing
in Estonia but receiving treatment in another member state was EEK
11497, whereas the average cost of receiving treatment in Estonia was only
EEK 3151. Increased mobility from newer to older member states will
therefore have a significant financial impact on the healthcare budgets of
the former.   
Also Latvia notes that costs are higher in other member states than in
Latvia and states that the current impact is that the financial equilibrium is
disturbed; 
If the expenses will continue to increase, the budget of Latvian institutions for
provision of healthcare services can decrease substantially. This will influence
the availability of healthcare services to Latvian residents. 
Slovakia has the same point of view, finding that more consideration needs
to be given to the financial impact of patient mobility because in some
countries healthcare prices are 5-10 times higher than in other countries. 
It is interesting to see the different considerations given to question 5
posed by the Commission. Question 5 concerns the action that needs to be
taken to ensure that treating patients from other member states is compatible
with providing a balanced medical and hospital service accessible to all.
Whereas for example Sweden and Germany state that the principle of non-
discrimination rules between patients from both home and abroad and that
do not entail a negative impact, the newer member states in particular
show much greater concern with regard to the longer term impact that
patient mobility may have on healthcare accessibility for the national
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population. A significant number of newer member states raise concerns
about how an inflow of foreign nationals for healthcare treatment may
cause imbalances in the national systems, creating longer waiting lists,
accessibility problems and a deterioration in service quality. Lithuania
argues that the price gap for healthcare services between member states
should be reduced in order to maintain the balance in providing equally
accessible inpatient and outpatient healthcare. Latvia also raises concerns
about that the price differences in services may cause a big inflow of
foreign patients. Together with Malta, but also the UK, Latvia argues that
member states should be allowed to limit the access of foreign patients,
thus allowing national health services to favour the national population. A
political position which is in direct conflict with the fundamental principle
of non-discrimination embedded in EU law:
Therefore member states shall have a right to set limitations for planned health
care treatment of other EU citizens in institutions providing state financed
health care. This measure is necessary to avoid limited access to healthcare of
Latvian citizens.
It is thus clear that the newer member states do not share the view that
patient mobility gives them a competitive advantage, but rather find them-
selves severely challenged when it comes to building up, planning and
maintaining a national healthcare system within open European borders. 
The challenge to the newer member states intensifies when we add the
mobility of health professionals. Although the statistics are not available,
the newer member states fear an outflow of health professionals, also
called ‘brain drain’. This emigration of doctors and nurses will have a
negative impact on the control of capacity planning as well as the quality
and effectiveness of healthcare services. With the active recruitment
policies from older member states that lack healthcare professionals and
the EU mutual recognition of diplomas, healthcare professionals from the
new member states will increasingly emigrate to other member states to
get better working conditions and higher salaries. Depending on the extent
of this phenomenon in individual states, this must in the medium term be
seen as a serious threat to the quality and effectiveness of the healthcare
supplies of the new member states. In the longer run, we must, however,
expect a levelling out of salaries within the health sector to reduce emigra-
tion. This in turn will diminish the price gap between the healthcare
services of the member states. It can thus be argued that equilibrium will
be established through demand and supply in the longer run. However, in
the medium term further patient mobility will be a natural consequence of
insufficient health supply, given that European citizens from newer
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member states also have a Community-based right to be treated without
undue delay. However, their national systems may increasingly become
incapable of meeting this right due to the outflow of health professionals
and possible inflow of foreign patients to specific healthcare niches.
Such cross-border imbalances could give rise to calls for some kind of EU
planning capacity. 
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The institutionalisation of EU rules on patient mobility has been consider-
ably furthered by judicial activism during the last decade. The piecemeal
developments have so far succeeded in constructing a significant set of
supranational patient mobility rights, which together constitute the con-
tours of an internal market for healthcare. Its future scope and content
depends on political responses and/or new judicial clarifications, brought
about by citizens, lawyers, intermediation agencies or private interests test-
ing the terrain of intra-European patient rights. 
The impacts and challenges of these developments on national healthcare
policies are increasingly identifiable. The analysis conducted in this report
has pointed out that the adaptive pressure on national healthcare models
has not forced them to respond in converging ways. Instead, the impact
depends on a set of mediating factors between EU developments and the
national outcomes. The impact de facto depends on patient mobility which
remains low at a general level, but is more dynamic within specific health-
care niches. Furthermore, patient mobility must be expected to increase in
the future as the transparency and clarity of EU rules improve and as the
information on the quality and efficiency of the healthcare system of the
neighbouring member state grows. Whereas the (re)interpretation of the
content and meaning of EU rules by national administrations still con-
stitutes a veto point which may hinder full impact, some member states
have implemented the case-law of the Court. The discretionary scope that
more reluctant member states can hide behind will evidently diminish as
others adapt. Furthermore, national institutions in place are decisive as
carriers of the EU institutionalisation process. 
However, the analysis has not confirmed that EU institutionalisation
primarily disfavours one healthcare family over another, for example
primarily disfavouring national health service systems since they appear to
be less compatible with the market logics of the internal market. Instead,
challenges and impacts cut across healthcare typologies and put pressure
on national institutions for a variety of reasons. 
The perhaps most significant impact of developments is that the territorial
closure of healthcare policies is compromised. The organising principle of
territoriality has been severely questioned by the exit option offered to
European citizens. That in turn compromises the steering capacity of
national administrations. The principle of territoriality has for long proven
to be an effective means through which budgetary control can be main-
tained. National authorities decide where and at what price healthcare can
be provided. In addition, territoriality makes policies more nationally
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coherent by establishing a means to control the quality of services through
nationally defined standards. Furthermore, it has been a means to facilitate
capacity planning as in and outpatient care are only provided nationally.
By having to integrate foreign supply, such traditional steering capacity is
undermined. 
Impacts also depend on the reasons why patients seek treatment in another
member state, or why they do not. One crucial barrier to mobility is the
lack of information about intra-European healthcare supplies. However,
there is no reason to believe that comparable, reliable information will not
become increasingly available. Either it will be publicly provided or if not,
different intermediation agencies will establish and guide patients through
the jungle of different options in accordance with specific needs. Such
information mediation can be provided by the insurance industry, other
private interests or non commercial welfare organisations, in particular if
supranational regulation continues to be absent. 
On the other hand, a key motivation for patient mobility is the private
economic rationale. When a member state uses user charges as a financial
method, it gives the patient an economic motive to consider healthcare
where it is provided at a lower cost. Thus public policies are decisive to the
motivations behind the healthcare choices of patients. Public policies also
determine the quality and efficiency of healthcare supplies. With the exit
opportunity provided by EU rules, such policy decisions can no longer be
made in isolation without considering the healthcare package and standard
of other member states. Patients – and voters – will compare the quality
and supply of the healthcare systems of their neighbouring states. In
this way, the internal market is primarily a challenge to those member
states which do not provide sufficiently high levels of healthcare quality or
sufficiently effective healthcare. 
When asked themselves, member states see challenges in different dimen-
sions, which do not mirror their specific healthcare model. Instead these
challenges depend on a) how they provide healthcare, as inpatient or out-
patient care, i.e. as hospital or non-hospital care, b) the way they plan
capacity, i.e. for example the use of waiting lists and finally c) the price
level of the national system compared to the other member states. 
It is mainly the newer member states that point out that the price level is a
challenge. They themselves do not regard being able to offer cheaper treat-
ment to patients from older member states – and thus build up a new
healthcare industry within specific niches - as a competitive advantage. On
the contrary, the challenges for the health systems of the newer member
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states are a) the outflow of health professionals to other member states and
b) the inflow of foreign patients which obstructs the accessibility to the
health systems for the national populations. These two negative impacts
may cause an imbalance in their national systems, creating longer waiting
lists and a deterioration in service quality. Furthermore, they see the finan-
cial equilibrium of their healthcare budgets as threatened since paying for
the treatment of one of their citizens in another member state is consider-
ably more expensive than if that treatment had been provided nationally.
With insufficient national supplies, also European citizens from the newer
member states will increasingly make use of their EU exit opportunity. 
For the time being, a great deal will depend on the Commission’s forth-
coming proposal on patient mobility and the subsequent Council negotia-
tions. New transparent and politically codified EU rules, which clarify and
extend Europe for the patients and provide means of redressing supra-
national rights, will in itself spur patient mobility. However, given the
significant disagreements between member states and their very different
priorities, a likely outcome might be no political agreement at all or one at
the lowest common denominator. Nevertheless, such an outcome is not
equal to re-established political or national control, since citizens, national
courts and the European Court of Justice will most certainly continue
their questions and interpretations. This means that the development will
continue to lack political direction and indeed visions on what to do in a
EU polity where citizens voice their rights, are not loyal to national provi-
sions and use their exit options from established welfare boundaries. Such
European citizen behaviour has a cross-border impact and therefore calls
for supranational (political) governance. In essence, the developments,
impact and challenges of EU patient mobility demonstrate recent dimen-
sions of European integration, and pinpoint what happens when Union
citizens start to practice European rights.
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Appendix – Health Care User Charges (MISSOC) 28
Member State User charges for which healthcare benefits
Belgium – Visit to general practitioner 
– Visit to medical specialist
– Pharmaceuticals
– Defined dental treatments 
The Netherlands – Specified dental treatments
– Pharmaceuticals 
– Orthopaedic products 
– Medically necessary transportation 
Germany – Fee for initial contact with medical or dental service provider
– In patient treatment (hospital or rehabilitation) per day of stay
– Pharmaceuticals
– Orthodontic treatment  
Austria – Stay at hospital per day
– Pharmaceuticals
– Specified dental treatments 
– Physiotherapy 
– Ergotherapy
– Medical rehabilitation 
– Fertilisation   
France – Visits to general practitioners and specialists 
– Hospitalisation. 20% and daily flat rate for hospitalisation 
– Pathology lab work
– Transport
– Pharmaceuticals 
– Dental treatments
– Hearing aids 
– Orthopaedics
Luxembourg – Consultation at general practitioner
– Home visit
– Hospital stay per day
– Pharmaceuticals
– Dental services
– Orthopaedic
– Eyeglasses
Spain – Pharmaceuticals
– Orthoprosthetic benefits 
Portugal – Consultation at health centre
– Doctor’s visit at home
– Emergency consultation in hospitals 
– Pharmaceuticals
– Dental care  
28 Data from MISSOC – INFO 02/2005. Health Care User Charges 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/missoc_info_en.htm#01/2006
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Member State User charges for which healthcare benefits
Italy – Specialised ambulatory services
– Rehabilitations in specialised centres 
– Health spas
– Pharmaceuticals 
Greece – Pharmaceuticals
– Hearing aids
– Spectacles
– Wheelchairs
– The regions can furthermore pose costs for non-hospital emergency care
Cyprus Government medical services are provided free of charge or at reduced rates,
depending on category of persons. Paying patients pay for:
– Medical visits 
– Accommodation and nursing 
– Medical attendance
– Pharmaceuticals 
Malta – No considerable co-payment in the public sector  
Denmark – Pharmaceuticals
– Defined dental treatments
– Physiotherapies 
– Chiropractic treatment 
– Hearing aids
Finland – Visit to doctor
– Stay in hospital per day. Day care and night care
– Day surgery in hospital 
– Long-term institutional care. Fees according to solvency
– Home help service and home nursing
– Dental healthcare 
– Pharmaceuticals 
– Transport
– The municipalities can determine the amount of client fees for healthcare
Sweden – Outpatient care
– Home visits
– Emergency care
– Referral to specialist treatment 
– Specialist treatment 
– Chiropractor 
– Gynaecologist 
– Inpatient care (hospital) per day 
– Pharmaceuticals 
– Dental treatment
– Eyeglasses
– Transportation 
– The different counties can apply different amounts of co-payments 
Ireland No considerable co-payments
Member State User charges for which healthcare benefits
United Kingdom – Dental care 
– Eye glasses for specific groups 
Czech Republic – Pharmaceuticals
– Defined dental treatments
Slovakia – Transport
– Per stay in hospital, accommodation and meals 
– Spa treatments 
– Defined dental treatments 
– Fertilisation 
– Abortion 
– Sterilisation 
Hungary – Pharmaceuticals
– Defined dental treatment 
– Extra services in hospitals (better room, meal conditions)
– Prosthesis 
– Spectacles 
– Hearing aids
Poland – Spa treatments 
– Specified dental treatments 
– Pharmaceuticals 
– Ambulance service 
Latvia – Outpatient visits to general practitioners and specialists 
– Doctor home visit
– Hospital stay per day 
– Pharmaceuticals
Lithuania – Pharmaceuticals
– Orthopaedic equipment 
Estonia – Flat fee for services 
– Patient visits
– Stay in hospital as bed day fee
– Pharmaceuticals
– Defined dental treatment
Slovenia – Services involving organ transplants, intensive therapy, radiotherapy, Dialysis 
– Fertilisation
– Termination of pregnancy 
– Specialist outpatient, hospital, health resort treatment
– Dental treatment, orthopaedics, hearing aids
– Non-urgent ambulance service 
– Pharmaceuticals
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